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I. INTRODUCTION
When asked to identify his or her mother, an individual would most
likely be able to specify one woman, maybe two or three, and
unequivocally identify her, or them, as the individual’s mother.1 However,
when asked what makes that woman his or her mother, an individual might
offer a variety of responses, e.g., she raised me, she gave birth to me, I have
her eyes, she married my father, she adopted me, and so on.2 To many
people, motherhood is a fairly straightforward concept; yet, when one
attempts to define it, the simplicity quickly disappears.3
A case recently decided by the Maryland Court of Appeals—the state’s
highest court—illustrates the complexity of defining motherhood and raises
interesting questions about the ways in which the law seeks to delineate
parentage.4 On August 23, 2001, a woman gave birth to twin girls at Holy
1. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 666 (Cal. 2005) (holding that
under the Uniform Parentage Act a child may have two female parents); Marsha
Garrison, Law For Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of
Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 852 (2000) (suggesting that depending on
how one defines “mother” a child may have three mothers—a genetic mother, a
gestational mother, and an intended mother).
2. See generally Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Gestation: Work For Hire or the Essence
of Motherhood? A Comparative Legal Analysis, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 91
(2002) (arguing that different definitions of motherhood are based on competing ethical
outlooks on what it means to be a “mother”); Peggy Orenstein, Your Gamete, Myself,
N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2007, (Magazine), at 34.
3. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Preface to MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST
THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD, at ix, x (Martha Albertson
Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995) (explaining that one’s experience of “mother” is
pivotal in shaping familial and social understandings, but that “mother” also has social
and political dimensions that vary across and within cultures); see also Garrison, supra
note 1, at 893 (asserting that the perception of parenthood is shifting to one of
functional status, rather than one derived from biology or legal entitlements).
4. See In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 125 (Md. 2007) (overruling the
Montgomery County Circuit Court and relying on the state equal rights amendment to
hold that courts must interpret Maryland’s paternity statute, which allows men to rebut
paternity based on evidence of the lack of a genetic relationship, to apply equally to
women).
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Cross Hospital in Silver Spring, Maryland.5 This woman, a gestational
surrogate, had no genetic relation to the newborns and would soon institute
a legal challenge seeking to deny maternity.6 With the assistance of a
physician, the newborns’ unmarried, biological, and intended father,
Roberto d.B., used his sperm and a donor’s eggs to create two embryos.7
The embryos then were implanted into the surrogate with whom Roberto
had contracted to carry the embryos, bring them to term, and give birth.8
Neither Roberto nor the surrogate had any intention at the time of the
agreement or at the time of birth that the surrogate would in any capacity
serve as a mother to the children.9
State law requires the records departments of Maryland hospitals to
submit information regarding births to the Maryland Division of Vital
Records (“MDVR”).10 Thus, when the gestational surrogate gave birth, the
hospital followed this procedure, as well as a Maryland statute that requires
that the birth certificate list the birth mother’s name unless there is a court
order providing otherwise. Consequently, the hospital listed the gestational
surrogate’s name on the twins’ birth certificates.11 The MDVR did not
object to Roberto’s request to remove the gestational carrier’s name, but by
law it could not do so without a court order.12 Both Roberto and the
5. See Caryn Tamber, Md. Court of Appeals Rules in Case of the Motherless
Twins, DAILY RECORD (Baltimore, Md.), May 17, 2007, at 1B (explaining that the
woman, whose name is not listed in court papers, was identified as the mother on the
twins’ birth certificate against her wishes).
6. See id. (indicating that the legal controversy over parentage arose from the birth
itself and not the surrogacy agreement).
7. See Arthur S. Leonard, Mom Can Dispute Maternity, GAY CITY NEWS, May 24,
2007, http://gaycitynews.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=18384009&BRD=2729&PAG=4
61&dept_id=568860&rfi=6 (last visited July 21, 2007).
8. See In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 130-31 (noting that although the specifics
of Roberto’s surrogacy contract are not at issue in the case, for-profit surrogacy
contracts are illegal in Maryland because for-profit surrogacy is interpreted as
purchasing custody of a child).
9. See Leonard, supra note 7 (observing that Roberto was fit to act as a single
parent in the eyes of the court).
10. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 4-208(a)(1) (West 2000) (providing that
the administrative head of an institution in which births occur must report each birth
within seventy-two hours of its occurrence); In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 117 n.1
(describing the role of the Maryland Division of Vital Records as issuing certified
copies of birth, death, fetal death and marriage certificates for events that occur in
Maryland).
11. See HEALTH-GEN. § 4-208(a)(7) (allowing court orders to modify
determinations of parentage when a court of competent jurisdiction has ruled on the
parentage of a child).
12. See HEALTH-GEN. § 4-211(a)(2) (West 2000) (providing that a revised birth
certificate can be issued when there is additional information or a change in the marital
status of the parents); see also Leonard, supra note 7 (noting that when paternity is
unknown, Maryland law allows for “father” to be left blank on a birth certificate and
that in the case of an abandoned baby the certificate will indicate “unknown
parentage”).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2008

3

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 3

286

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 16:2

surrogate petitioned the county circuit court for an order requiring the
surrogate’s name to be removed from the birth certificate.13 The circuit
court judge refused to issue the order, ruling that Maryland case law did not
support removing the surrogate’s name and that to do so would not be in
the best interests of the children.14 When Roberto appealed, the Maryland
Court of Appeals held that the state paternity statute violated the Maryland
equal rights amendment by affording men, but not women, an opportunity
to rebut parentage on the basis of genetic relation.15
This Comment argues that existing tests for determining legal maternity
in cases of surrogate births are inadequate because such tests fail to protect
gestational surrogates from compelled maternity and resulting equal
protection violations. In fact, the existing theories and tests themselves
frequently cause the equal protection violations.16 This Comment agrees
with the holding of the Maryland Court of Appeals in In re Roberto d.B.
and asserts that the court’s opinion appropriately grasps the import of equal
protection in instances of gestational surrogacy.
Part II of this Comment frames the history and medical technology of
gestational surrogacy. Part II also examines the four prevailing legal
theories that influence or control adjudication of maternity in cases
involving gestational surrogates: (1) the parties’ intent; (2) the parties’
genetic contributions; (3) gestational primacy—i.e., giving birth indicates
legal maternity; and (4) the best interests of the child. Comparing In re
Roberto d.B. to past cases, Part III illustrates how the four theories fail to
guarantee gestational surrogates the equal protection of the laws. Part IV
examines the implications that In re Roberto d.B. will likely have on
statutory interpretation in Maryland. Finally, Part V concludes that as
gestational surrogacy and other forms of assisted reproductive technology
become more commonplace, any legal test for adjudicating maternity must
incorporate equal protection considerations that safeguard women from
compelled maternity by affording women and men equal opportunities to
rebut parentage.
13. See In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 118 (explaining that the parties’ petition
sought an “accurate” certificate that reflected Roberto as the sole parent).
14. See id. at 119 n.4 (rejecting the lower court’s reasoning that the gestational
carrier’s name should remain on the birth certificate for “health reasons”—e.g., the
compilation of medical records—and noting such reasoning makes “little sense”
because the father had all pertinent medical records).
15. See id. at 125; see also Leonard, supra note 7 (suggesting that the ruling in In
re Roberto d.B. indicates that a majority of the judges on the Maryland Court of
Appeals applied a very expansive interpretation of the state equal rights amendment).
16. Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:2 (1990) (codifying gestational
primacy and providing that a woman is the mother of a child to whom she gave birth),
with N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:3 (1990) (providing men the opportunity to rebut a
presumption of paternity by filing an action to dispute paternity within thirty days of
the child’s birth).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol16/iss2/3

4

Stark: Born To No Mother: In Re Roberto D.B. and Equal Protection for Ge

2008]

BORN TO NO MOTHER

287

II. BACKGROUND
Most laws governing surrogacy assume that the surrogate “mother” is
related genetically to the child and thus fail to address the increasingly
common role of gestational surrogacy as a form of assisted reproduction.17
A. Distinguishing Gestational and Traditional Surrogacy
A surrogate commonly is defined as one who substitutes in bringing a
pregnancy to term for another person who is unable to become pregnant.18
Surrogacy can be distinguished into two types: traditional and gestational.19
In traditional surrogacy, the surrogate’s egg is fertilized by way of
intrauterine insemination—more commonly known as artificial
insemination.20 A traditional surrogate possesses a genetic relation to the
child she carries; thus, a child born of traditional surrogacy is the
biological—both genetically and gestationally speaking—result of the male
contributor and the surrogate.21 Conversely, in gestational surrogacy, the
surrogate bears no genetic relation to the child she carries.22 In
17. See Garrison, supra note 1, at 852 (observing that the law fails to provide
answers to questions regarding the rights and obligations of the various parties to
assisted reproduction, and concluding that when the pace of scientific change is rapid,
it may be preferable to initially deal with resulting legal issues on an ad hoc basis to
prevent reactive and constrictive new laws).
18. See CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE
129 n.2 (ABA Publishing 2006) (observing that many jurisdictions prohibit for-profit
surrogacy but that they do not necessarily prohibit surrogacy in which the only money
exchanged covers the medical and legal expenses of the surrogate); John Lawrence
Hill, What Does it Mean to Be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the Basis For
Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 396 (1991) (noting that science has distilled
the traditional phases of procreation—coitus, conception, and gestation—into their
component parts, wreaking havoc on prevailing conceptions of parenthood).
19. See KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 18, at 129 (explaining that surrogacy
first existed only in the context of assisted intrauterine insemination but science has
advanced to the point of allowing a woman to bear a child with whom she has no
genetic relation).
20. See id. at 29-30 (describing how intrauterine insemination is the oldest form of
non-coital reproduction and has been called “artificial” because sperm is introduced by
a mechanism other than a penis). Many courts are beginning to refer to the procedure
exclusively as intrauterine insemination in an effort to avoid the judgmental
connotations associated with “artificial.” Id.
21. See id. at 131 (explaining that due to the biological connection between the
traditional surrogate and the child, in a traditional surrogacy agreement it is standard
for the traditional surrogate to agree to surrender the child for adoption to the intended
mother).
22. See id. at 132 (noting that there are several variations of gestational surrogacy,
but in the most common manifestation a woman’s ova are retrieved and fertilized in
vitro by her male partner’s sperm or that of a donor). In vitro fertilization is a
procedure in which an ovum is fertilized outside the womb by sperm with the intent
that the resulting embryo will later be transplanted into a uterus. Id. at 75. Embryos
implanted in a gestational surrogate can also be the result of donor eggs and/or donor
sperm. See, e.g., Buzzanca v. Buzzanca (In re Buzzanca), 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282
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differentiating the two types of surrogacy, therefore, the legally and
medically significant distinction is that a gestational surrogate—unlike a
traditional surrogate—gives birth to a child to whom she has no genetic
connection.23
B. Establishing a Legal Framework for Gestational Surrogacy
Embodying both common law understandings and social notions of
motherhood, the law regarding determinations of maternity in instances of
traditional surrogacy is well-settled, deeming the traditional surrogate the
mother.24 However, the advent and increasing occurrences of gestational
surrogacy challenge these common law and social understandings of
maternity.25 When faced with the task of adjudicating or defining legal
maternity in connection with gestational surrogacy, courts, legislatures, and
legal scholars have relied on four different theories: (1) the parties’ intent,
(2) the parties’ genetic contributions, (3) gestational primacy, and (4) the
best interests of the child.26
1. The Johnson Intent to Procreate Test
When Mark and Crispina Calvert contracted with Anna Johnson to carry
an embryo created from Mark’s sperm and Crispina’s ovum, they did so
intending to parent the child to whom Anna would give birth.27 When
Anna asserted legal maternity based on her gestational role in the birth of
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (adjudicating parentage where a husband and wife agreed to have
an embryo that was unrelated genetically to either of them implanted in a surrogate).
23. See, e.g., In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 117 (Md. 2007). Compare UNIF.
STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT, § 2 (1989) (defining “surrogate”
as an adult woman who enters into an agreement to bear a child conceived through
assisted conception for intended parents), with UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, § 3 (1973)
(indicating that the natural mother is established by proof of her having given birth to
the child).
24. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988) (holding that
contracts for traditional surrogacy conflict with New Jersey adoption statutes because
they implicate the payment of money for a child, finding that such contracts are void as
a matter of public policy, and, in light of such holdings, deeming the surrogate the
mother of the child); see also KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 18, at 132
(explaining that because there is a genetic connection, courts are unlikely to enforce a
contract’s surrender provisions against a surrogate mother who is also the biological
mother of the child).
25. See Alayna Ohs, Note, The Power of Pregnancy: Examining Constitutional
Rights in a Gestational Surrogacy Contract, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 339, 340 (2002)
(observing that gestational surrogates often are described as providing a service
whereas traditional surrogates are viewed as “baby-sellers”).
26. See Amy M. Larkey, Note, Redefining Motherhood: Determining Legal
Maternity in Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 605, 621 (2003)
(opining that although many state legislatures have yet to deal explicitly with the issue
of gestational surrogacy, existing theories might give potential parents a sense of legal
predictability).
27. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993).
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the child, the Calverts claimed that their genetic relationship to the child
made them the legal and natural parents.28 As the first court to determine a
parentage dispute arising from gestational surrogacy, in Johnson v. Calvert,
the California Supreme Court sided with the Calverts and held that the
parties’ intentions regarding parentage—as expressed in the surrogacy
contract—determined maternity.29 Thus, because the parties formed and
entered the surrogacy agreement with the understanding that Anna would
gestate the embryo and that Crispina would be the mother for all legal
purposes, the court followed the contract and deemed Crispina the
mother.30
2. The Belsito Genetics Test
In Belsito v. Clark, an Ohio court of common pleas employed a different
test, holding that legal maternity should be determined primarily on the
basis of genetic relation between woman and child.31 After Anthony and
Shelly Belsito conceived a child in vitro and had the embryo implanted in
Shelly’s younger sister, Carol Clark, who had agreed to serve as their
gestational surrogate, the Belsitos sought a pre-birth parentage order
declaring themselves the sole natural and legal parents.32 The court
rejected the intent to procreate test formulated in Johnson, reasoning that
intent could often be hard to prove or lead to unreasonable or unacceptable
results; instead, the Belsito court held that the test for identifying natural
parents should be rooted in genetics.33 The court further stated that for
28. Id. at 778 (observing that blood tests excluded Anna as the genetic mother, and
noting the parties agreed to a court order providing the child would remain with the
Calverts with visitation by Anna until the matter was fully resolved).
29. See id. at 782 (labeling the intended parents the “prime movers”—the
instigators or commissioning parties—of the procreative relationship).
30. See id. (holding that although genetic relationship and birth both are recognized
under California law as acceptable means of establishing maternity, when the two
means do not coincide in one woman, she who intended to bring about the birth of a
child and intended to raise the child as her own is the mother).
31. 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54, 61-62 (1994) (discarding the Johnson intent to procreate
test for three reasons: (1) difficulty in application, (2) public policy, and (3) Johnson’s
failure to recognize and emphasize the genetic provider’s right to consent to
procreation).
32. Id. at 58 (explaining that Shelly sought the parentage order from the court when
she learned that, according to Ohio law, the woman who gave birth to the child would
be listed on the birth certificate as the child’s mother). Additionally, Shelly learned
that because Carol, the surrogate, and Tony, the genetic father, were not married to
each other, the child would be considered illegitimate under the law. Id. At no point,
however, did Carol attempt to establish herself as the legal mother of the child. Id. at
56.
33. See id. at 62 (considering that even when parties have a written agreement,
disagreements regarding intent can arise if the terms of the contract are unclear or if
one party claims there was pressure to enter the contract). The court dismissed intent
because such a test could lead to a situation in which a child has two mothers if the
non-genetic gestational carrier and the female genetic provider both intend to procreate
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determinations of legal parentage, a birth test, premised on gestation and
the process and fact of giving birth, should be secondary to genetics.34 In
other words, the Belsito court concluded that genetics, then gestation, are
the key elements to determinations of legal maternity.35
3. Pre-birth Parentage Orders and Assertions of Equal Protection in
Response to Gestational Primacy and Best Interests Standards
The Baby M case, in which the New Jersey Supreme Court deemed the
traditional surrogate the child’s mother but awarded custody to the intended
mother—the natural father’s wife—based on the best interests of the child,
drew national attention to the issue of surrogacy.36 After Baby M, a
handful of state legislatures across the nation enacted statutes governing
surrogate births.37 Exemplifying the theory of gestational primacy, which
posits that the gestational mother is always the legal mother, many such
state laws established rigid determinations and definitions of maternity.38
Post-Baby M statutes unequivocally confirmed the birth mother as the legal
mother.39

and raise the child. Id.
34. See id. at 65 (distinguishing between natural parents—genetic providers—and
legal parents—caretakers—such that giving birth must still be relevant to determining
legal parentage because a genetic mother may waive her claim to maternity).
35. See id. (concluding that the birth test should be subordinate to genetics in
determining legal maternity because a genetic test favors the natural mother and
implicitly advancing the idea that a “natural” mother-child relationship—i.e., one
premised on genetics—supercedes all other forms of such a relationship).
36. See Cori Anne Natoli, Baby M, Away From the Spotlight, Turns 13, THE
RECORD (Bergen County, NJ), Mar. 28, 1999, at N07 (reflecting on the media circus
that followed both the trial and Melissa Stern—a.k.a. Baby M—throughout her
childhood in the form of frequent requests for interviews); Iver Peterson, Ruling in
Baby M Case is Due Today, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1987, at B2 (observing that legal
scholars nationwide followed the case).
37. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:2 (1990) (providing that a woman is
the mother of a child to whom she has given birth); see also Angie Welling, Pair Sue
for Parent Status, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City, UT), Sept. 18, 2002, at A01
(asserting that the Utah legislature was uninformed and reactionary when, in 1989, it
passed a statute rendering for-profit surrogacy contracts void and providing that the
surrogate mother is the mother for all legal purposes).
38. See Brief for Boston Fertility Society et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Plaintiffs at 35, Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133 (Mass.
2001) (No. SJC-08600) (explaining that states use the gestational primacy approach in
an effort to discourage gestational surrogacy agreements under the belief that such an
approach makes intended parents less likely to enter surrogacy agreements).
39. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 69.14(h) (West 2003) (providing that information
about the surrogate mother shall be entered on the birth certificate and the information
about the genetic father shall be omitted from the birth certificate); IND. CODE Ann.
§ 31-20-1-1 & -2 (1997) (declaring enforcement of any surrogate agreement that
requires a surrogate to waive parental rights or duties to violate public policy and
stating that any surrogacy contract formed after March 14, 1988 is void).
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Two cases illustrate the varying degrees to which courts are willing to
equivocate on gestational primacy.40 In Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess
Medical Center, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that trial
courts have the authority to consider requests for pre-birth determinations
of parentage in cases of gestational surrogacy.41 After Marla Culliton and
her husband Steven successfully conceived an embryo in vitro and had that
embryo implanted in a gestational surrogate, they petitioned for a court
order declaring themselves the natural and legal parents of any children
resulting from that embryo.42 The Supreme Judicial Court declared the
Cullitons the lawful parents of the twins born to the gestational surrogate.43
Unlike Culliton, however, in A.H.W. v. G.H.B. a New Jersey Superior
Court refused to issue a pre-birth parentage order to genetic parents
employing a gestational surrogate.44 The A.H.W. court held that to issue a
pre-birth order would conflict with New Jersey law providing that a birth
mother may not surrender her rights until seventy-two hours after the
birth.45
In some instances, rather than seeking pre-birth parentage orders, genetic
mothers employing gestational surrogates raised equal protection claims
challenging the constitutionality of statutes codifying gestational primacy.46
For example, in Soos v. Superior Court, the genetic mother of triplets born
with the assistance of a gestational surrogate brought suit alleging an equal
protection violation when, under state law, her husband could prove
paternity by offering DNA evidence, but she was precluded from doing so
40. Compare Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1141
(Mass. 2001) (entering a parentage order deeming the genetic parents the legal parents
of twins carried by a gestational surrogate), with A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 953
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (holding that although the surrogate is extremely likely
to surrender her parentage rights as planned, she must not be compelled to do so in a
pre-birth order).
41. 756 N.E.2d at 1139 (observing that unwanted consequences of legal parentage,
such as the responsibility to make medical decisions for the child, can be minimized or
avoided when lower courts consider petitions for pre-birth parentage orders).
42. Id. at 1138 (explaining that the gestational surrogate agreed with the order
sought and that the hospital did not contest plaintiffs’ complaint or petition).
43. Id. at 1141.
44. See 772 A.2d at 954 (concluding that a court order for the pre-birth termination
of the surrogate’s parental rights is the equivalent of enforcing an agreement to
surrender a child and is contrary to New Jersey statutes and precedent set in Baby M).
45. Id. (explaining that due to emotional and physical changes in the mother that
occur at birth, New Jersey law stipulates the voluntary surrender of a child is invalid if
occurring within seventy-two hours after the birth of the child).
46. See J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1293 (D. Utah 2002) (concluding that a
statute presuming the surrogate is the mother for all legal purposes has no conclusive
effect in light of genetic evidence); Soos v. Super. Ct., 897 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding that an Arizona statute allowing a biological father to prove
paternity and automatically granting a surrogate the status of legal mother violated
equal protection).
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because the surrogate was declared the legal mother in accordance with
state law.47 The Soos court held that by affording a procedure for proving
legal parentage to the genetic father, but not the genetic mother, the state
denied the mother the equal protection of the laws.48
The J.R. v. Utah decision further illustrates the intersection of equal
protection doctrine and surrogacy.49 In J.R., the genetic mother alleged that
a Utah statute was unconstitutional because the statute conclusively
presumed the surrogate to be the legal mother.50 In response, the State of
Utah asserted that the surrogacy statute served two important governmental
purposes: (1) protecting the best interests of the child, and (2) protecting
the surrogate’s health and well-being.51 The plaintiffs argued that rather
than protect the gestational surrogate, the Utah statute forced parenthood
upon someone who did not want it.52 The J.R. court held that the state may
presume that the birth mother is the legal mother, but upon presentation of
genetic evidence to the contrary, that presumption must dissolve.53 The
J.R. court invalidated the specific section of the Utah statute requiring the
birth mother to be the legal mother.54

47. See 897 P.2d at 1358 (explaining that the parentage controversy arose during a
marriage dissolution in which the biological father argued that he and the surrogate are
the legal mother and father, and that the biological mother lacks standing to claim
custody); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (1989) (stating that a surrogate is
the legal mother of a child born as a result of a surrogacy contract and that if she is
married, her husband is presumed the legal father, but that this presumption is
rebuttable).
48. Soos, 897 P.2d at 1361 (finding that the state showed no compelling interest to
justify the dissimilar treatment of men and women similarly situated—the genetic
mother and father).
49. See 261 F. Supp. 2d at 1294 (concluding that the application of the Utah statute
deeming the surrogate the legal mother violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal
protection guarantee, because it allows the genetic father, but not the genetic mother, to
be listed on the birth certificate of a child born to a gestational surrogate).
50. Id. at 1274 (detailing plaintiffs’ assertion that the Utah record-keeping scheme,
which treats the genetic parents differently, denies the genetic mother the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection guarantee).
51. Id. at 1280 (explaining defendants’ assertion that the statute was enacted to
ensure that a child born of a surrogacy agreement would enter the world with at least
one easily identifiable legal parent—the birth mother).
52. Id. at 1287 (considering plaintiffs’ argument that the role of a gestational
surrogate is to assist others in building their families, before concluding that the Utah
statue in effect compels maternity).
53. Id. at 1294 (asserting that the state cannot deny the existence of a parental
relationship based entirely on the fact that the parent is a woman).
54. See id. at 1296 (finding that after reviewing the statute as a whole, the
remaining sections—those dealing with the contractual aspects of surrogacy
agreements—may stand, because they further the legislative purpose of precluding
enforcement of such contracts when the parties are in dispute).
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III. OVERLOOKING EQUAL PROTECTION: THE FOUR PREVAILING THEORIES
REGARDING DETERMINATIONS OF LEGAL MATERNITY IN CASES OF
GESTATIONAL SURROGACY FAIL TO PROTECT AGAINST COMPELLED
MATERNITY
Writing for the majority in In re Roberto d.B., Chief Judge Robert M.
Bell of the Maryland Court of Appeals stated: “what has not been fathomed
exists today.”55 Chief Judge Bell, referring to scientific advances in
assisted reproductive technology allowing novel forms of procreation,
accurately portrayed the evolving technological advancements.56 Chief
Judge Bell noted that the Maryland paternity statute did not anticipate the
potential legal issues arising from reproductive technology, and that such
issues would continue to arise unless the laws were construed in light of
new technology.57 In other words, the rapidly advancing technologies that
enable assisted reproduction were not contemplated in 1984 when
Maryland enacted its paternity statute.58 Despite the less sophisticated
medical technology of the time, given that the “chauvinistically titled”
statute was enacted twelve years after Maryland’s equal rights amendment,
it is probable that legal scholars realized the sex discrimination inherent in
the statute.59 The science is new, but the mandate of equal protection is
55. 923 A.2d 115, 122 (Md. 2007) (illustrating the antiquities of the Maryland
paternity statute by articulating that it does not provide for a situation where the parents
are unmarried, much less a situation where children are conceived through assisted
reproductive technology).
56. See id. (determining that whether the reasons for not bearing a child in the
traditional sense are biological or not, adoption is no longer the only option for building
a family outside of coital procreation); see also JUDITH F. DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 36 (LexisNexis 2006) (observing that although medical
treatment for infertility can be traced back to fifth-century B.C. writings, Louise
Brown, born on July 25, 1978, was the first child conceived and delivered following in
vitro fertilization).
57. In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 122 (maintaining that the Maryland statute, as it
currently exists, codifies gestational primacy and prevents rebuttals of maternity, which
restricts, rather than protects, intended parental relationships). These restrictions go
against the statute’s legislative purpose to achieve and protect the best interests of the
child. Id. See also Tamber, supra note 5, at 1B (describing a conversation with a law
professor in which the professor described the In re Roberto d.B. holding as a “rather
simple and brilliant solution to a situation not contemplated by Maryland law”).
58. Compare MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1006 (West 1984) (providing that
proceedings to disestablish paternity may be initiated during pregnancy), with MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 4-208 (1982) (establishing the birth mother as the child’s
mother).
59. See In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 137 n.1 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (addressing
how the mechanisms for resolving questions of parenthood are framed only in terms of
determining who is the father, as opposed to considering both parents, and concluding
that this chauvinism sends mixed messages about the establishment of the titles of
parent, father, and mother). The In re Roberto d.B. court observed that the Maryland
Court of Appeals consistently holds that the State violates the Maryland equal rights
amendment by imposing a burden or granting a benefit based on sex without a
substantial basis for the action. Id. at 122-23.
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not.60
Although neither Johnson nor Belsito explicitly involved equal
protection arguments, these oft-cited cases created a framework for the
evaluation of gestational surrogacy that completely disregards issues of
equal protection.61 The Johnson “intent to procreate” test fails to safeguard
the rights of a gestational surrogate who does not want to be the mother of
any child born from the surrogacy arrangement.62 Likewise, although the
ultimate holding of Belsito supports the decision of the Maryland Court of
Appeals in In re Roberto d.B., the Belsito court’s logic poses problems for
a gestational surrogate who wishes to unequivocally end her involvement
upon birth.63 Similarly, statutes codifying the theory of gestational primacy
that compel legal maternity on the gestational surrogate violate the
surrogate’s equal protection rights by preventing her from rebutting
maternity the way a non-genetic male could do with regard to paternity.64
Finally, when a court deems a gestational surrogate the legal mother,
believing that doing so achieves the best interests of the child, the court
misapplies the best interests standard and inappropriately ignores the
surrogate’s right to equal protection of the laws.65 In re Roberto d.B.
remedies the problems of all four theories currently used to determine legal
60. See J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1287 (D. Utah 2002) (asserting that the
assumption that women can be forced to accept the “natural” status of motherhood
typifies women in a manner that has frequently triggered equal protection issues); see
also Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982) (holding that the
governmental objective to protect women based on archaic stereotypes is illegitimate).
61. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 785 (Cal. 1993) (noting an equal
protection claim is not articulated and that the facts do not necessitate invoking one,
because of the situational differences between a woman who voluntarily agrees to
gestate a fetus and a wife who provides the ovum for fertilization); see also Susan E.
Dalton, From Presumed Fathers to Lesbian Mothers: Sex Discrimination and the Legal
Construction of Parenthood, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 261, 263 (2003) (arguing that
fast-moving developments in reproductive technology force courts to reconsider what
constitutes a parent, highlighting the importance of having courts address issues of
equality and differences in reproduction).
62. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779 (concluding that presentation of blood test
evidence—i.e., genetics—is one means of establishing maternity, and proof of having
given birth is another); see also Soos v. Super. Ct., 897 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1995) (Gerber, J., concurring) (arguing that compelling motherhood on a surrogate
imposes burdens and duties that far exceed her contract because a surrogate’s agreed
upon role is to carry the child, not to nurture or raise it).
63. See Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54, 67 (1994) (formulating the law in a
manner that gives weight to both genetic connection and birth in determinations of
maternity because of the distinction between natural and legal mothers).
64. See Malina Coleman, Gestation, Intent, and the Seed: Defining Motherhood in
the Era of Assisted Human Reproduction, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 497, 525 (1996)
(observing that the application of a gestational primacy test interferes with the private
and personal aspects of reproduction by mandating motherhood).
65. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 18, at 403 (asserting that, although studies indicate
the importance to a child of developing a secure relationship with at least one parent
figure early in childhood, there is no evidence suggesting that a child must form this
relationship with a gestational parent).
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maternity by requiring that males and females be afforded equal
opportunities to rebut parentage.66
A. The Intent to Procreate Test Fails to Provide an Adequate Solution to
Cases Like In re Roberto d.B. Where Existing Laws May Not Sanction
Parties’ Intent
Intent alone is an insufficient legal test for adjudications of maternity in
instances where the parties’ intent may challenge traditional gender norms
or stray from traditional family structures.67 Because the court in Johnson
dealt with a situation in which a husband and wife wanted to have a child
with their genetic pattern and took steps to achieve that result, the court
formulated an intent to procreate test that safeguards the intended parents
should parentage be contested.68 The intent to procreate standard provides
better protection than all other standards because families established
through assisted reproductive technologies are families of choice as well as
intent, and respecting the parties’ intentions is the best way to ensure
parentage is by choice.69 However, as the facts of In re Roberto d.B.
illustrate, one’s intent to procreate can sometimes result in arrangements
where existing law thwarts the parties’ procreative intentions.70 For
example, gestational surrogacy is not an option for an unmarried couple in
Virginia because that state’s law requires the intended parents to be
married.71 Because legal regulation of surrogacy often embodies social
66. See 923 A.2d 115, 122-23 (Md. 2007).
67. See Dalton, supra note 61, at 265 (hypothesizing that sex discrimination in

parentage determinations is “grounded in gendered constructions of parenthood” as
opposed to reproductive differences grounded in biology because of social
understandings of what constitutes a family).
68. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 786 (Cal. 1993) (explaining that to the
extent tradition has a bearing on the case, both legal and historical tradition favor the
claim of the couple to procreate and form a family of their own).
69. See Coleman, supra note 64, at 505 (asserting that the intent rule treats the
interests of both the intended mother and the gestational surrogate as worthy of
equivalent protection); Larkey, supra note 26, at 623 (noting that an intent-based theory
for determining legal maternity is attractive because it is unambiguous and provides
those entering surrogacy agreements with confidence that the terms of their agreements
will be upheld); see also Ilana Hurwitz, Collaborative Reproduction: Finding the Child
in the Maze of Legal Motherhood, 33 CONN. L. REV. 127, 135 (2000) (observing that
many academics support an intent-based theory for determining legal maternity
because such a theory prioritizes the commissioning mother’s bid for legal maternity
regardless of genetic or gestational connection).
70. See 923 A.2d at 117 (demonstrating that the development of assisted
reproduction technology leads to the law being tested because it creates novel questions
of law, which tend to be matters of first impression when adjudicated); see also
Hurwitz, supra note 69, at 131-32 (observing that ten percent of women of childbearing
age in the United States—over six million women—are unable to conceive and carry a
pregnancy to term, resulting in the scope of reproductive technologies broadening and
the use of such technologies increasing).
71. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (West 1991) (defining “intended parents” to
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notions of what constitutes a good or desirable family arrangement, parties’
intentions would be unlikely to sway a court interpreting statutes requiring
the intended parents be married.72 Thus, the Johnson court’s determination
that maternity be decided in accordance with the parties’ intent becomes
irrelevant when, as in In re Roberto d.B., the parties’ intent goes against the
grain of social understandings of parenthood and family composition—
intent will not trump existing law.73
The Belsito court’s rejection of an intent-based test, because such a
standard could lead to “unacceptable results,” provides an example of a
court ruling in accordance with social understandings of family
composition.74 By terming a hypothetical arrangement in which two
females intended to parent a child “problematic,” the Belsito court
implicitly accepted the popular notion that a family must consist of a male
and female parent, a husband and a wife.75 When a court faced with
adjudicating parentage in a case of assisted reproductive technology
expresses disapproval of nontraditional family arrangements, such
disapproval makes clear that the parties’ intentions warrant little merit
should such intentions deviate from the social norm.76 Further, because
assisted reproductive technology itself challenges traditional
understandings of procreation, even if the intended parents are heterosexual
and married, the break from conventional reproduction may be enough for

mean a man and a woman, married to each other, providing that all surrogacy
agreements must be approved by a court, and mandating that if a court vacates the
order approving the surrogacy contract, the gestational surrogate is the mother of the
child and her husband, if any, is the father).
72. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 788 (Lucas, C.J., concurring) (arguing that the
“multiplicity of considerations at issue in a surrogacy situation” require careful, nonadversarial analysis and that the legislature, not the judiciary, is suited best to reflect
the social values at stake).
73. See In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 136 (Cathell, J., dissenting) (asserting that
the presence of a father is invaluable to a child’s development and that there is similar,
or greater, value in having a mother involved in rearing children, and concluding a
child will be affected adversely if it has no mother); see also Garrison, supra note 1, at
894 (reporting that most Americans believe children need both a father and a mother
and that children are better off in a two-parent household).
74. See Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54, 62 (1994) (asserting that even in fact
patterns where intent is clear, the Johnson intent to procreate test may bring about
unacceptable results, results contrary to the social values expressed in enunciated
public policy of current law).
75. See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 1, at 887 (charging that concern about the impact
of single parenting on children and its resultant social costs has led to paternity reform
and revision of child support standards).
76. See id. at 893-94 (declaring that in recent years, more so than at any other point
in history, courts have held that parents’ rights are secondary to children’s interests
because children are increasingly viewed in legislation and litigation as the rightsbearing party and that one such right includes the right to know and be cared for by
both of their parents).
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a court to override the parties’ intentions.77
The dispute in Johnson centered on the determination of the natural
mother.78 While the California Supreme Court ultimately based its holding
that Crispina was the natural mother on the parties’ intent, the language and
reasoning used by the court clearly indicates the court’s view that both
Anna and Crispina had solid ground on which to assert maternity.79
Consider, then, what might have happened had the case not involved a
heterosexual, married couple employing a gestational surrogate but a gay
male couple.80 Because the determination in such a case would not turn on
choosing between two women, but rather determining if a child could have
no mother at birth, the case would likely have turned on an interpretation
and application of California adoption law; in other words, the court would
likely have viewed the surrogate as the mother and she would have needed
to surrender the child for adoption.81 Alternatively, because the Johnson
court structured its opinion on the fact that two women both asserted
maternity, the court may have employed different reasoning or reached a
different decision regarding parentage if it had been faced with a single
male individual contracting with a gestational surrogate.82
In either of the hypothetical instances proposed above, where there is not
a second woman vying for maternity, the Johnson court’s language is not
clear regarding whether the parties’ intent would be dispositive to
determining parentage.83 The Johnson court stated that California law

77. See, e.g., A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 954 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000)
(noting that the parties’ detailed agreement “reflects their shared intent and desired
outcome for the case” but nonetheless refusing to issue a pre-birth parentage order
mirroring that intent because to do so would conflict with existing statutes regulating
adoption laws).
78. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 779 (Cal. 1993) (explaining that under
the California Civil Code, §§ 7001-02, the “parent and child relationship” means the
legal relationship existing between a child and his natural or adoptive parents, incident
to which the law imposes rights, privileges, duties and obligations). The court in
Johnson viewed the term “natural mother” as referring to a mother who is not an
adoptive mother. Id. at 782 n.9.
79. See id. at 782 (assessing that the court had to determine intent only after it was
satisfied that both women presented acceptable proof of maternity under the California
Civil Code).
80. See id.
81. See id. at 784 (elucidating Ms. Johnson’s argument that the surrogacy contract
violates policies underlying California adoption statutes because it in effect constitutes
a pre-birth waiver of parental rights).
82. See id. at 783 (explaining that the child would not have been born but for the
actions of the intended parents, who are a married couple desiring children with their
own genetic makeup).
83. See id. at 782; see also Jeffrey M. Place, Gestational Surrogacy and the
Meaning of “Mother”: Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 907, 908 (1994) (asserting that the Johnson court reached intent only
because it incorrectly concluded that gestation was sufficient proof of maternity).
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provides for a rebuttable presumption of paternity based on genetic
evidence and assumed that maternity, as well, may be rebutted.84 However,
the Johnson court’s assumption is merely dicta and has had no effect on the
California paternity statute, which currently makes no mention of maternity
or its possible rebuttal.85 Throughout the Johnson opinion, the language
betrays the assumption of heterosexual couples setting in motion the
procreative events.86 Moreover, the most important fact to the Johnson
court’s ultimate disposition of the case is the fact that two women both
presented evidence satisfactorily establishing maternity.87 While the
Johnson intent to procreate test functions well in situations in which courts
must make determinations between two women as to natural motherhood—
one an intended parent and the other not—it fails to protect the gestational
surrogate in instances where state law compels legal motherhood despite,
and in direct contradiction to, the intentions expressed in the surrogacy
agreement.88
Therefore, a gestational surrogate relying solely on
previously expressed intentions to disavow maternity may not succeed in
her rebuttal.89
Although the ruling by the court of appeals in In re Roberto d.B.
effectively enforces the surrogacy contract because the decision mirrors the
parties’ intent, that case does not create an intent to procreate test for all
women giving birth in Maryland.90 By ignoring intent and focusing on the
legal doctrine of equal protection, the Maryland Court of Appeals correctly
84. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781.
85. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7555 (1992) (providing that there is a rebuttable

presumption, affecting the burden of proof, of paternity if the court finds that genetic
testing precludes the possibility of paternity).
86. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 (discussing Mark and Crispina’s aim to bring a
child into the world and noting that had Anna at any time manifested a desire to be a
mother she would not have been the chosen gestational surrogate). The court declined
to accept the contention of the amicus curiae, the ACLU, that the child has two
mothers because a recognition of parental rights in a third party would diminish
Crispina’s role as the mother. Id. at 781 n.8.
87. See id. at 781 (observing that presumptions contained in California Civil Code
§ 7004, which describes situations in which evidence points to a particular man as
natural father, do not apply to the issue before the court). The Johnson court stated that
there was no need to resort to evidentiary presumptions to ascertain the identity of the
natural mother, and found that it must undertake a purely legal determination between
the two claimants. Id.
88. See, e.g., A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 953 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000)
(rejecting the intended parents’ and gestational surrogate’s joint claim that the
surrogate merely acted as an incubator and terming that argument a “simplistic
comparison” because it ignores the fact that there are human emotions and biological
changes involved in pregnancy).
89. See id. at 954.
90. See In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 125 n.15 (Md. 2007) (reasoning that the
paternity statute merely establishes the process by which men, and now women, can
challenge parentage and observing that the paternity statute does not consider intent as
a factor to take into account).
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held that the name of the gestational surrogate need not be listed on the
birth certificate of the child she delivers.91 The In re Roberto d.B. ruling is
significant because it illustrates a successful assertion of equal protection to
safeguard the parties’ intent.92 Unlike the Belsito court, the court of
appeals did not shy away from the nontraditional aspects of Roberto d.B.’s
intent to be a single parent.93 Moreover, unlike Johnson or Belsito, In re
Roberto d.B. does not attempt to define “mother” and thus avoids the social
values arguments that appear in Johnson and Belsito.94 The absence of
such arguments reinforces the holding of In re Roberto d.B. because no
questions are raised regarding the applicability of equal protection to
nontraditional family structures, unlike Johnson and Belsito, where it is
unclear whether the tests enunciated would apply to nontraditional family
forms.95 The In re Roberto d.B. plaintiffs’ equal protection arguments
carried more legal weight than a mere assertion of intent because they were
rooted in the long-accepted legal doctrine of equal protection, further
bolstered by the doctrine’s codification in the Maryland equal rights
amendment.96
B. The Genetics Test Does Not Safeguard Against Instances of Compelled
Motherhood in Cases Where the Egg Donor Is Unknown or the Genetic
Mother Is Unable or Unwilling to Fulfill the Role of Legal Mother
As in Johnson, the Belsito court’s analysis and reasoning fails to protect
a gestational surrogate from compelled motherhood.97 Despite interpreting
an Ohio law similar to the Maryland statute declared unconstitutional in In
re Roberto d.B., the court in Belsito merely subordinated the birth test to
the genetics test—ruling that while genetics must be the key factor, birth is
91. See id. at 124 (concluding that because the Maryland equal rights amendment
forbids the granting of more rights to one sex than the other, the paternity statutes in
Maryland must be construed to apply equally to men and women).
92. See id. at 118 (noting the gestational surrogate’s contention that under the
surrogacy agreement she had a reasonable expectation that her role in the lives of the
twin girls would terminate upon delivery of the children).
93. See id. at 117.
94. See id. at 125 n.15.
95. See id. at 123-24 (concluding that the basic principle of the Maryland equal
rights amendment is that sex is not a permissible factor in determining the legal rights
of women, or men, and that treatment of any person by the law may not be based upon
the circumstances that such a person is of one sex or the other).
96. See id. at 124 (holding that the equality between the sexes demanded by the
Maryland equal rights amendment focuses on rights of individuals under law that
encompass all forms of privileges, immunities, benefits and responsibilities of citizens).
97. See Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54, 58 (1994) (asserting that the law will
impose the duties of a child-parent relationship only upon those individuals who can be
found to be a natural or adoptive parent). But see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.02
(West 2000) (enunciating that maternity may be established by identifying the natural
mother through the birth process or by other means, including genetic testing).
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nevertheless still a determinant of maternity.98 Creating a fallible legal test,
the Belsito court split its holding between the identification of natural and
legal parents when a child is conceived in vitro and carried by a surrogate.99
The Belsito court determined that natural parentage must always be
determined by genetics, but also concluded that legal parentage may be
settled by genetics first, or by birth second.100 Because women cannot
rebut maternity but men can rebut paternity, the Belsito holding created a
legal framework likely to result in equal protection violations when the
birth test compels maternity.101 Although no longer equal to genetics,
under the court’s reasoning the birth test still plays a very important role in
determining legal maternity.102 Thus, had Shelly died during Carol’s
pregnancy, Carol would have been the legal mother under both Ohio law
and the court’s reasoning, creating a situation of forced maternity because
Carol did not wish or intend to be the mother. The Belsito genetics test
therefore fails to safeguard the rights of a gestational surrogate who wishes
not to assume the legal status of mother in three instances: (1) in the event
of the death of the egg provider and intended mother, (2) in instances
where the egg donor is unknown, and (3) in instances where the natural
mother waives her rights after implantation but before birth.103 Recall the
hypothetical gay male couple or the imagined single male mentioned above
in regard to the inadequacies of the Johnson intent to procreate test.
Because both of these scenarios could create situations in which an
unknown egg donor is used, the gestational surrogate would be compelled
98. See Belsito, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d at 59-60 (observing that for millennia giving
birth was synonymous with providing the genetic makeup of the child, and explaining
that although science now facilitates separation of the two, birth and genetics are still
valid and reliable ways of determining maternity).
99. See id. at 66 (holding that natural parentage to a child born of a surrogate is
determined by genetics and that legal parentage may be determined by birth where the
genetic parents have waived their rights and decided not to raise the child); see also
Dawn Wenk, Note, Belsito v. Clark: Ohio’s Battle with “Motherhood,” 28 U. TOL. L.
REV. 247, 268 (1998) (elucidating that the Ohio court adopted a two-part natural
parent/legal parent determination instead of the California one-step intent test because
the court reasoned an intent test could be difficult to apply).
100. See Belsito, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d at 64-65.
101. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.03 (West 2006) (providing that a
presumption of paternity can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that
includes the results of genetic testing).
102. See Belsito, 67 Ohio Misc. at 66 (concluding that the natural parents of a child
delivered by a gestational surrogate who has been impregnated through in vitro
fertilization shall be determined by genetics, but that if the natural parents relinquish or
waive their rights to be the legal parents, the birth mother shall be the legal mother).
103. See, e.g., Michelle Pierce-Gealy, “Are You My Mother?”: Ohio’s CrazyMaking Baby-Making Produces a New Definition of “Mother,” 28 AKRON L. REV. 535,
563 (1995) (arguing that if prenatal testing discloses significant fetal abnormalities, the
genetic parents may be more likely to waive their rights as natural parents, leaving the
gestational surrogate in a position of compelled legal maternity under the Belsito
court’s holding).
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to assume the status of legal mother under the logic of the Belsito opinion
simply because she is the birth mother. Although a natural mother may
waive her parental rights to a child, a legal mother may not.104 Thus, the
Belsito genetics test, in conjunction with the birth test, effectively ends the
option of employing a gestational surrogate for gay male couples or single
male individuals, and instead requires them to resort to adopting the child
from the surrogate to end her status as legal mother.105
The Belsito court correctly observed that surrogacy was causing the law
to adapt and wondered if the genetics test, the birth test, or some other
means would be used to identify those with the legal status of natural
mother.106 Failing to foresee the insufficiencies of their decision, the
Belsito court did not, however, imagine or speculate that in some instances
where the surrogate asserts her equal protection rights, all those means
might fail, and the child might end up with no legal mother when a
surrogate rebuts maternity.107
By deciding the issue of legal maternity on the basis of equal protection
rather than genetics or birth, in In re Roberto d.B. the Maryland Court of
Appeals posited a framework that solves the inadequacies of the Belsito
court’s split methodology.108 Under In re Roberto d.B., should the genetic
and intended mother die during the gestational surrogate’s pregnancy, the
surrogate could rebut maternity.109 Similarly, again because the In re
Roberto d.B. reasoning has nothing to do with genetics, a gestational
surrogate would be protected from compelled maternity in instances of
both known and unknown egg donors.110 Because the opinion of the court
of appeals is rooted in equal protection, rather than a genetic or birth test,
In re Roberto d.B. establishes precedent for the protection of gestational
surrogates from compelled maternity and remedies the potential problems

104. See Belsito, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d at 63 (noting that in adoption proceedings the
natural mother may waive her rights and responsibilities in order to establish a new
legal parent or parents).
105. See id. (acknowledging that a court adjudication of adoption clearly ends the
rights and responsibilities of the natural parents and establishes parental rights of the
adoptive parents). But see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.03 (West 1996) (defining
persons who may adopt as a husband and wife acting together, an unmarried individual,
or a married individual acting alone if his or her spouse is a parent of the minor; thus,
the Ohio definition excludes same-sex couples seeking to adopt as a couple).
106. See Belsito, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d at 60.
107. Compare id. (questioning how the law will adapt determinations of maternity to
fit cases in which the birth mother did not provide the genetic imprint for a child), with
In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 121 (Md. 2007) (concluding that Maryland law
accommodates a birth certificate on which the mother is not identified).
108. See In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 119 n.4.
109. See id. at 124.
110. See id. at 121.
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of the Belsito court’s fallible split test for determining maternity.111
C. Because Men Can Rebut Paternity in the Absence of a Genetic
Relationship, Statutes Embodying a Theory of Gestational Primacy Violate
a Gestational Surrogate’s Rights to Equal Protection
The presence of equal protection language in Soos represents an
important departure from the intent-and-genetics-based language found in
cases adjudicating parentage between the gestational surrogate and the
genetic parents.112 The holding of the Arizona Court of Appeals in Soos
correctly invalidated an Arizona statute that unequivocally made the
gestational surrogate the legal mother because the statute violated genetic
mothers’ equal protection rights.113 By affirming the trial court’s holding
that there was no compelling state interest justifying summary denial of a
genetic mother’s rights, the Arizona Court of Appeals appropriately
recognized that codifying gestational primacy leads to equal protection
violations because such codifications unequivocally assign maternity to the
woman giving birth, therefore creating different procedures for establishing
maternity than for paternity.114
However, as much as the Soos opinion illustrates the introduction of
equal protection doctrine to parentage determinations arising after
surrogate births, the Soos court did not apply equal protection analysis for
the purpose of protecting a gestational surrogate from compelled
maternity.115 In other words, the issue in Soos leads to an assertion of equal
protection for the purpose of proving maternity, not rebutting maternity—
an important distinction in light of the fact that much legal regulation of
surrogacy attempts to achieve families with both a mother and a father.116
111. See id. at 124 (holding that the Maryland paternity statute must be interpreted
to extend the same proceedings—disavowals of parentage based on genetic testing—to
women and maternity as it applies to men and paternity).
112. See Soos v. Super. Ct., 897 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)
(emphasizing that the court is not dealing with the constitutional questions that arise
when a surrogate mother wishes to keep the child she bore and limiting the court to the
question of whether a statute can withstand constitutional scrutiny when it affords a
genetic father the opportunity to prove paternity but does not afford a genetic mother
the same opportunity).
113. See id. at 1360 (explaining that although a gender-based distinction is at issue,
the Arizona surrogacy statute must be tested using strict scrutiny because of the ways in
which it abridges the mother’s fundamental right to procreate and infringes upon her
fundamental right to custody and control of her children).
114. See id. at 1358.
115. See id. at 1360-61 (asserting that because the Arizona statute precludes the
genetic mother from demonstrating a genetic relationship she is denied equal protection
of the laws).
116. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (1993) (providing that a contract for gestational
surrogacy shall not be binding and enforceable unless the gestational surrogate is
eighteen years of age or older and the commissioning couple are legally married and
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The Soos holding utilizes the same equal protection doctrine central to In re
Roberto d.B., but does so for the purpose of protecting the genetic mother’s
constitutional rights rather than the rights of the gestational surrogate.117
Therefore, Soos rejects Arizona’s codification of gestational primacy not
for the sake of safeguarding the gestational surrogate’s right to equal
protection or protecting her from compelled motherhood.118 This is a
problem that In re Roberto d.B. rectifies by explicitly holding that women
must be afforded the same rights given to men with respect to rebutting
parentage.119
Conversely, although the issue in J.R. v. Utah, like in Soos, centered on
proving the legal maternity of the genetic mother, the J.R. plaintiffs pushed
the boundaries of Soos by contending that the Utah statute forcing legal
parenthood infringed on the surrogate’s right to make procreative
decisions.120 Because such logic prevents compelled maternity, the J.R.
court rightly maintained that to give effect to the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantee of equal protection, the Constitution’s protection of procreative
choice—a fundamental right implicating Due Process—must be at least as
strong when a woman decides to give birth to a child as when she decides
not to do so.121 Such an assertion comes closer to calling for a full rebuttal
of legal maternity than any of the language used by the Arizona Court of
Appeals in Soos.122 By asserting the surrogate’s right to a full rebuttal of
are both eighteen years of age or older). Compare Soos, 897 P.2d at 1359 (discussing
the aspects of the Arizona statute that allow a man to prove paternity and gain custody
in light of a proved genetic link with a child), with In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 121
(discussing the aspects of the Maryland statute that allow a man to rebut paternity by
proving the absence of a genetic relation with a child).
117. See Soos, 897 P.2d at 1361 (concluding that the state denied the mother equal
protection of the law by affording the father a procedure for proving paternity, but not
affording the mother any means to prove maternity).
118. See id. (McGregor, J., concurring) (agreeing with the trial court’s reasoning for
holding the statute unconstitutional because it imposes the burdens of motherhood on a
surrogate who does not intend maternity and did not contract for it).
119. See In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 125 (concluding that the procedures set
forth in the paternity statute work quite well with respect to men and must now be
made available to women as well to avoid equal protection violations).
120. See J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1274 (D. Utah 2002) (concluding that
with a statutory presumption that a surrogate is the mother of children born to her, the
state has in effect declared that the surrogate engaged in procreation even though the
resulting children are neither her genetic nor intended children).
121. See Ohs, supra note 25, at 350 (charging that surrogacy contracts necessarily
involve the surrogate’s right to bodily integrity because such contracts involve
pregnancy, which significantly alters a woman’s body for nine months); see also
Coleman, supra note 64, at 525 (arguing that gestational primacy interferes with private
reproductive choices).
122. See J.R., 261 F. Supp. 2d at 1279 n.10 (suggesting that a state-imposed burden
on affirmative procreative choice must withstand the same degree of scrutiny as a stateimposed burden on the choice to seek or have an abortion because both implicate
deeply personal aspects of fundamental civil liberties such as privacy).
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maternity, the J.R. plaintiffs used equal protection logic to protect the rights
of both the genetic mother and the gestational surrogate.123
With its rejection of gestational primacy, the court in In re Roberto d.B.
rightly held that the mere fact of giving birth cannot equal maternity
without resulting in equal protection violations because men are not
similarly deemed fathers in such an unequivocal manner.124 Unlike those
advanced in Soos and J.R., the equal protection arguments in In re Roberto
d.B. were asserted for the exclusive purpose of rebutting maternity—not for
the purpose of establishing another woman as the true legal mother.125 In
re Roberto d.B., therefore, is the only case in which equal protection served
solely to protect a gestational surrogate rather than to protect the intended,
genetic mother.126 The departure from equal protection arguments asserted
on behalf of a genetic mother is significant because it illustrates the
important role of equal protection in safeguarding nontraditional families of
choice, created with the use of assisted reproductive technology, from
restrictive legal presumptions of maternity.127
Although neither Culliton nor A.H.W directly address issues of equal
protection, the presuppositions made by the court in each case illustrate the
manner in which gestational primacy violates equal protection.128 When
considered in light of the equal protection logic of Soos, J.R., and In re
Roberto d.B., it is clear that the Culliton and A.H.W. courts’ implicit
123. See id. at 1287.
124. See 923 A.2d at 120 (explaining that under the Maryland paternity statute

alleged fathers can deny paternity by demonstrating the lack of a genetic relationship to
a child).
125. Compare J.R., 261 F. Supp. 2d at 1272 (describing the plaintiffs’ contention
that the Utah statute, conclusively presuming the surrogate mother to be the mother of
the child, violates the genetic mother’s right to equal protection because her husband
can prove parentage but she cannot), and Soos v. Super. Ct., 897 P.2d 1356, 1359-60
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (explaining that under an Arizona statute a man can prove
paternity and gain custody by proving a genetic link with a child), with In re Roberto
d.B., 923 A.2d at 121 (discussing the aspects of a Maryland statute that allows a man to
rebut paternity by proving the absence of a genetic relation with a child).
126. See Leonard, supra note 7 (asserting that the holding of the Maryland Court of
Appeals that no mother’s name need appear on the birth certificate is unprecedented).
127. See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 302
(viewing medical progress as expanding the potential for expression and effectuation of
procreative intentions, and asserting that legal rules governing procreative
arrangements should recognize the legitimacy of individual efforts); see also Leonard,
supra note 7 (observing that the equal protection reasoning in In re Roberto d.B. offers
a useful approach for gay men seeking to have children through surrogacy).
128. See, e.g., Larkey, supra note 26, at 612-13 (arguing that the A.H.W. court
refused to recognize the biological differences between gestational surrogacy and
traditional surrogacy because the court did not consider the lack of genetic relation
between the surrogate and the child, and that this refusal resulted in the court denying a
pre-birth parentage order and compelling maternity for the first seventy-two hours after
birth).
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acceptance of gestational primacy results in equal protection violations of
both the genetic mother and the gestational surrogate because, unlike men,
the women in Culliton and A.H.W. had no opportunity to assert or rebut
maternity until after maternity was assigned to the surrogate.129
Moreover, because the theory of gestational primacy equates maternity
with gestation while equating paternity with genetics, gestational primacy
results in unequal and dissimilar determinations of parentage.130 Although
some feminist scholars argue that defining maternity based on genetics and
overlooking gestation degrades women by equating motherhood with
fatherhood, the fact remains that gestational primacy leads to unequal
parentage determinations by considering different factors for men—
genetics, and women—birth.131 The logic of In re Roberto d.B. remedies
the problems imposed by theories of gestational primacy because equal
protection reasoning in determinations of maternity allows gestational
surrogates to play an important part in creating families, thus valuing
gestation, but does not posit that gestation is the sine qua non of maternity
or motherhood.132

129. See Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their
Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 815-16
(2007) (asserting that whatever sex role differences in family relations custom may
engender, government may not entrench such differences by using law to restrict
women’s bodily autonomy and life opportunities in ways that government does not
restrict men’s bodily autonomy and life opportunities, and concluding that laws
imposing gender-specific burdens on women’s parenting relations are constitutionally
suspect because they do not apply equally to men).
130. See Garrison, supra note 1, at 913 (asserting that a gestation-based approach to
maternity relies on traditional stereotypes of female nurturance, and concluding that the
equal protection clause mandates a similar approach to maternity and paternity
determinations).
131. See, e.g., Katha Pollitt, When Is a Mother Not a Mother (Surrogate Mother
Case of Anna Johnson), 251 THE NATION 843 (1990) (asserting that the general pattern
in society is to recognize women’s experiences to the extent that they are identical to
men’s and to devalue or ignore women’s experiences to the extent that they are
different, and concluding that this is why the mother’s non-genetic contributions to
maternity—gestation and birth—are degraded). But see Garrison, supra note 1, at 917
(observing that to rely on gestation as the determinant of motherhood, and genetics as
the determinant of fatherhood, undesirably introduces a gender-specific element to
determinations of parentage).
132. See In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 125 n.14 (Md. 2007) (noting that the
woman who belongs on the birth certificate depends entirely on the definition accorded
to the term “mother”); see also Siegel, supra note 129, at 834 (concluding that
legislatures can vindicate equal citizenship values through policies that promote the
equal freedom of men and women in reproduction and parenting).
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D. Compelling Maternity on a Gestational Surrogate Based on a Best
Interests of the Child Standard Results in a Misapplication of that Standard
and Unconstitutionally Infringes Upon the Rights of the Surrogate
Because the best interests standard is a wholly fact-based standard and
therefore only legitimate when invoked on a case-by-case basis, the best
interests test should not be used to conclusively and summarily override a
gestational surrogate’s right to equal protection of the laws.133 Responding
to the state of Utah’s argument regarding the well-being of the child, the
J.R. court labeled the best interests of the child standard as totally factdriven and noted that the Utah statute required no fact finding to decide that
in all instances the gestational surrogate is the legal mother.134 Therefore,
the J.R. court appropriately dismissed the best interests standard asserted
by the defense because it effected a legislative predetermination of the best
interests of the child that violated the surrogate’s rights.135 Although the
Utah statute allegedly protected the best interests of the child by ensuring
that a child born of a surrogacy agreement enters the world with at least
one easily identifiable legal parent, thus preventing the child from being
orphaned at the whim of the genetic parents, the statute in fact prevented
the child from having full legal relationships with his two genetic, intended
parents.136 Thus, statutes that attempt to regulate surrogacy in accordance
with the best interests of the child rarely achieve the child’s best interests
and instead complicate matters by forcing litigation to resolve parentage
and protect the rights of the intended parents and the surrogate.137
Like the court in J.R., in In re Roberto d.B. the Maryland Court of
Appeals correctly held that the best interests of the child standard did not
apply to the matter of maternity before the court because the context in
which the case arose did not warrant an application of the best interests
133. See J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1285 (D. Utah 2002) (determining that
although a child’s welfare is a paramount consideration in any parentage proceeding it
is not the sole consideration to the exclusion of parental rights).
134. See id. at 1284-85.
135. See id. at 1286-87 (stating that the state’s concern for the child, however
compelling it may be, cannot sustain a legislative act that would immediately and
without discussion rewrite the facts of parenthood to suit legislative preferences as to
matters of public policy); see also Garrison, supra note 1, at 917 (noting that although
the gestator’s contributions to fetal development are vital, such contributions do not
induce the sort of attachment on the part of the child that has led courts to protect
children’s established relationships).
136. See J.R., 261 F. Supp. 2d at 1280 n.14 (pointing out that if the Utah statute
mandating motherhood for the surrogate is enforced according to its terms, neither the
surrogate nor the state can force the intended, biological parents to take responsibility
for the child).
137. See Shultz, supra note 127, at 397 (concluding that honoring the plans,
expectations, and rights of adults who will be responsible for a child’s welfare is more
likely than legislative presumptions to correlate with positive outcomes for parents and
children alike).
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standard.138 More specifically, the In re Roberto d.B. court rightly held that
because the best interests standard depends on the circumstances of the
case, the standard cannot justify legislative presumptions that uniformly
and unequivocally mandate maternity for a gestational surrogate.139
Gender-based and gender-biased presumptions asserted to protect the
child’s best interests violate the principles of equal protection by:
(1) introducing gender stereotypes into determinations of parentage to the
detriment of both traditional and nontraditional families, and
(2) establishing different and unequal procedures through which men and
women can either assert or rebut parentage.140
IV. THE EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE STATE
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT IN IN RE ROBERTO D.B. WILL LIKELY HAVE
FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS
The complete reliance by the Maryland Court of Appeals on equal
protection to adjudicate the issue of maternity before the court in In re
Roberto d.B. provides a critical legal lens through which to view gendered
parentage statutes.141 Because of the court’s expansive interpretation of the
state equal rights amendment, In re Roberto d.B. will likely spur change in
legal understandings of the statutory interpretation and construction of
gendered statutes.142 For example, the In re Roberto d.B. court held that the
text of the Maryland paternity statute setting forth procedures for paternity
138. See 923 A.2d 115, 129 (Md. 2007) (holding that the best interests standard is
inappropriate unless a fact-finder deems a parent unfit or there is some exceptional
circumstance exposing the child to harm).
139. See id. at 130 (concluding that in balancing court-created and statutorilycreated standards governing parentage where no parent has been found unfit,
constitutional rights are the ultimate determinative factor—not the non-constitutional
best interests standard).
140. See Shultz, supra note 127, at 341-42 (observing that concerns about the wellbeing of children focus on the fact that in procreative arrangements made by adults the
children get no say, but noting that children’s best interests are not ordinarily protected
by letting children make decisions, and concluding that the state should intervene only
as a last resort).
141. See In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 124 (holding that because Maryland’s equal
rights amendment forbids the granting of more rights to one sex than the other,
Maryland’s paternity statutes must be construed to apply equally to both males and
females); see also Siegel, supra note 129, at 817 (asserting that sex equality analyses
must be skeptical of the traditions and customs that shape the sex and family roles of
men and women, and concluding that critical engagement of tradition is a crucial part
of any sex equality outlook).
142. See Linda J. Wharton, State Equal Rights Amendments Revisited: Evaluating
Their Effectiveness in Advancing Protection Against Sex Discrimination, 36 RUTGERS
L.J. 1201, 1241 (2005) (concluding that courts are justified in subjecting gendered
statutes to rigorous standards of review under state equal rights amendments because
the text and legislative history of such amendments illustrate legislators’ intent to
provide greater protection than that previously afforded sex discrimination under state
constitutions).
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rebuttals need not be rewritten to include women or maternity explicitly,
but nonetheless must be interpreted to extend such procedures to women,
casting Maryland’s gendered statute as gender-blind.143 The requirement
that a statute explicitly mentioning men must now be read to implicitly
include women essentially has the same effect as removing the malespecific language because the understood application of such language to
women in effect negates any specific reference to males.144 In re Roberto
d.B., therefore, stands as important precedent for any future case in which
Maryland courts must interpret gendered laws because the case affirms that
the state equal rights amendment forbids legal determinations on the basis
of sex, absent a compelling government interest.145
Moreover, In re Roberto d.B. illustrates the extent to which state equal
rights provisions can be used to thwart legislative attempts to control
family composition.146 Although the Maryland equal rights amendment
was central to the In re Roberto d.B. court’s holding, twenty-two states
explicitly prohibit sex discrimination in their state constitutions, and all
states are subject to the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal
protection.147 However, women will more likely be successful in rebutting
maternity under a state equal rights provision than the Fourteenth
Amendment because state provisions generally require strict scrutiny,
compared to the intermediate scrutiny applied under the federal Equal
Protection Clause.148 For example, a state court in a state without an
143. In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 125; see also Wharton, supra note 142, at 1282
(concluding that sex-neutral standards applied in a non-biased fashion that seek to
undermine traditional gender roles are beneficial to both women and society at large).
144. See Shultz, supra note 127, at 394-95 (concluding that the creation of parentage
rules that offset even biological differences—e.g., pregnancy—will ultimately lead to
greater gender freedom and flexibility because such rules will not treat men as
secondary to women’s perceived dominance in the realm of procreation and
childrearing).
145. See In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 122-23 (holding that any action by the State
that, without a substantial basis, imposes a burden on, or grants a right to, one sex and
not the other, violates the Maryland equal rights amendment because the amendment
prohibits the conferring or denying of rights in a sex-based manner).
146. See Wharton, supra note 142, at 1203 (maintaining that due to serious
inadequacies in the protection offered by the U.S. Constitution, state equal rights
amendments are important tools for combating sex discrimination, and as such have
frequently been used to successfully challenge state laws that contain sex-based
distinctions regarding the rights and responsibilities of unwed parents and their
children); see also Siegel, supra note 129, at 817-18 (claiming that a sex equality
approach to reproductive rights is the best way to challenge gender-differentiated
norms that structure parenting).
147. See Wharton, supra note 142, at 1202-04.
148. See Paul Benjamin Linton, State Equal Rights Amendments: Making a
Difference or Making a Statement?, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 907, 940-41 (1997) (concluding
that most litigation brought under state equal rights provisions involves statutes or
judicial doctrines that discriminate or allegedly discriminate against men in favor of
women—e.g., spousal support—and asserting that the reason for such male-centered
litigation is that women’s issues have been addressed adequately in federal legislation).
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explicit prohibition of sex discrimination in its state constitution could
more easily hold that compelling motherhood on a gestational surrogate
satisfies an important governmental objective of maintaining desirable
family structures because such a court needs only to satisfy the federal
standard of review required by the Fourteenth Amendment, not the higher
level of scrutiny mandated by a specific prohibition of sex-based
distinctions.149 Therefore, In re Roberto d.B. demonstrates the value of a
state equal rights amendment in holding gender distinctions impermissible
under law.150
V. CONCLUSION
Relying on the equal protection principles codified in the Maryland
equal rights amendment, In re Roberto d.B. protects the rights of a
gestational surrogate, and, more broadly, signals an important step toward
recognizing and respecting the rights of women who help others achieve
the desire to be a parent.151 As assisted reproduction continues to challenge
gender norms and traditional family structures, and more courts are faced
with novel questions of law presented by the use of assisted reproductive
technology, the courts will be well-served by In re Roberto d.B.’s
application of equal protection principles to gestational surrogacy because
such principles will become increasingly relevant to interpretations of
parentage statutes.152
In the years and decades to come, science will only further advance,
resulting in greater access to and use of assisted reproductive
technologies.153 With advancing medical science comes greater legal
But see Wharton, supra note 142, at 1203 (asserting that the combination of an
emerging conservative majority on the U.S. Supreme Court and the insulation of sex
discrimination from heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment impacts
women more heavily than men in areas of reproduction).
149. See Wharton, supra note 142, at 1214 (explaining that legal scholars use the
fact that the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to prohibit racial discrimination, not
sex discrimination, to justify the less rigorous standard of review for sex discrimination
under it, but concluding that the difference in standards reflects a pervasive intuition
that the problem of sex discrimination is not as grave, harmful, or significant in
American history as that of race discrimination).
150. See In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 123 n.15 (Md. 2007) (explaining that
Maryland courts interpret the Maryland equal rights amendment to require the
application of a strict scrutiny standard when reviewing gender-based discrimination
claims).
151. See id. at 118.
152. See Dalton, supra note 61, at 263 (arguing that courts construct parenthood as a
gendered status by inappropriately using traditional, biological reproduction as the
benchmark against which all parents are judged, and determining that technological
developments resulting in nontraditional paths to parenthood make non-gendered,
equality-based analyses important to legal determinations of parenthood because
assisted reproductive technologies challenge traditional understandings of parenthood).
153. See Shultz, supra note 127, at 396 (asserting that objections to assisted
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responsibility to ensure that all those choosing assisted reproductive
technologies to create a family have adequate legal protections. Moreover,
because assisted reproduction frequently involves parties other than the
intended parent or parents, the law must not and cannot ignore the rights of
such third parties.154 As legislators adapt family law—paternity statutes,
surrogacy laws, and statutes regulating pre-birth parentage orders—to
reflect new and increasingly used medical science, legislators must
consider how to best frame the law to protect heterosexual, two-parent
families, same-sex or single-parent families, and any third parties that may
play a part in creating such families.155 Any legal standard guiding
adjudications of parentage must apply equally to men and women, as well
as to traditional and nontraditional families, or else the law risks favoring
convention over innovation, the past over the future.

reproductive technology range from fear that human, scientific control of procreation
represents arrogance, to anxiety about the depersonalization of sex, procreation, and
childrearing, and concluding that whether individuals will be allowed access to the
range of choices now scientifically possible depends on resolution of public debate
regarding how the law should accommodate new understandings of parenthood).
154. See Hurwitz, supra note 69, at 132 (observing that from 1992 to 1996 births of
children conceived from donor eggs grew at a compound annual rate of twenty-five
percent and from 1993 to 1996 births of children carried by gestational surrogates
increased at a compound annual rate of thirty-four percent).
155. See Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1137 (Mass.
2001) (finding that existing Massachusetts parentage statutes are an inadequate and
inappropriate vehicle through which to resolve parentage determinations of children
born through gestational surrogacy because those statutes do not consider reproductive
advances made in recent years); see also Jane C. Murphy, Protecting Children by
Preserving Parenthood, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 969, 983 (2006) (asserting that
designing an ideal, uniform parentage statute will not address all of the complex
political, socioeconomic, and scientific issues that affect the legal recognition of
parentage, and concluding that legal reform must be comprehensive).
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